Could one of these “struggling” starters be the answer?
Teams often wait until July to make moves because it often takes that long to figure out if your team is coming or going. The Colorado Rockies do not have that problem. They currently sit at 12-55 as this is being written. To put this in perspective, that means they have 95 games left on the season. If they finish 48-47 they will finish 60-102 on the season. As my grandfather used to say, they are so far down in the basement you have to pipe light to them.
So, when you are looking at Colorado Rockies numbers, you have to use a decoder ring to see the numbers as anything other than a Cleveland Spiders retrospective. They have two veteran starters that have been decent as ML pitchers for over a half decade, but their season numbers this year look like a train wreck.
German Marquez: 13 GS, 63.0 INN, 2-8 W-L, 7.00 ERA, 5.9 K/9
Kyle Freeland: 13 GS, 67.2 INN, 1-8 W-L, 5.19 ERA, 6.9 K/9
The first thing I do with any pitcher is completely throw out the won-loss record. No one on a 12-55 team is going to have a good won-loss record and I don’t know how relevant that is. However, there are a few things we can look at when we drill down into the numbers. The first thing we can do is look at the stats that indicate how a pitcher is really pitching along with some numbers that can explain that.
Marquez: .351 BABIP, 55.3% LOB, 5.08 xERA, 4.46 FIP, 4.87 xFIP, 4.87 SIERA
Freeland: .362 BABIP, 58.4% LOB, 4.73 xERA, 3.64 FIP, 3.73 xFIP, 3.99 SIERA
First, I think everyone is familiar with these ERA estimators and everyone probably has their preference as to which one is the most accurate and relevant. At this point, that might be an interesting side discussion, but it has little bearing on this conversation. Each and every one of them say these guys are better than their current numbers. The BABIP and the LOB% are strong indications as to why. Freeland has a career .312 BABIP and a 72.5% LOB rate for his career. Marquez sits at .307 and 69.3% in those two numbers.
So, even if we just simply assume a regression to the mean then these guys are due to turn it around. However, it becomes more important to look at why these numbers happen and what a move to Houston might entail for both of them. Since, we are leaning on the aggregate, let’s look at the home and road splits for both of these pitchers over the course of their entire careers.
Marquez Home: 91 G, 517.2 INN, 31-28 W-L, 5.06 ERA, 8.9 K/9
Marquez Road: 99 G, 565.1 INN, 36-36 W-L, 4.12 ERA, 8.2 K/9
Freeland Home: 111 G, 581.2 INN, 34-34 W-L, 4.89 ERA, 6.9 K/9
Freeland Road: 108 G, 589.2 INN, 27-47 W-L, 4.15 ERA, 6.5 K/9
So, if we assume these guys are right around their career norms and we remove them from the mile high environment then they essentially become league average pitchers. That is with a Rockies team that is on pace to lose 100 or more games for the third consecutive season, have four seasons in a row with 90 or more losses, and haven’t finished above .500 since 2018.
Now, why does this occur? There are three plausible explanations that have been bandied about, but we can really only measure two of those. The first one is the Coors Field effect. Simply put, the spacious confines surrender more hits and it doesn’t particularly matter who is fielding and who is pitching. The second one is that the Rockies might have substandard fielders behind these pitchers. We can measure both of those. We will start with the park factors according to Statcast and Baseballsavant.com
2025: 112 (30th)
2024: 112 (30th)
2023: 112 (30th)
2022: 111 (30th)
2021: 113 (30th)
I should note that Daikan (or Minute Maid Park) has measured around 100 or league average for most of those same seasons. 11, 12, or 13 percent may not seem like much, but in relative terms there wasn’t a team close to them in any particular season. While these numbers likely surprise no one, it is still important to check our assumptions at the door and take a look. Now, let’s take a look at the fielding numbers.
2025: -30 DRS (27th), -4 OAA (18th)
2024: +20 DRS (14th), +9 (10th)
2023: +20 DRS (14th), -1 (16th)
2022: +9 DRS (18th), -2 (19th)
2021: +61 DRS (5th), +3 (14th)
In other words, coming into this season, the fielders that the Rockies put out there were roughly league average overall in comparison with the other fielders. Yet, Coors Field just yields more hits than other parks. The assumption is that the Rockies must be a bad fielding team, but the reality is that this has only been the case this season. In some seasons, they were actually good. Now, let’s take a look at the Astros’ numbers over that same span.
2025: +2 DRS (18th), +18 OAA (2nd)
2024: +1 DRS (20th), -3 OAA (18th)
2023: +15 DRS (17th), +8 (11th)
2022: +67 DRS (4th), +32 (2nd)
2021: +76 DRS (3rd), +37 (2nd)
This obviously depends on the source. Outs above average utilizes statcast data which many consider to be more accurate. According to them, the Astros were the second best team in baseball three out of the last five seasons. They were in top half of the league in four of those seasons. So, they may not have been the best fielding team for the past five years, but statcast seems to think they are among the best.
That means three important factors are converging to make acquiring one of these pitchers enticing. First, their numbers at sea level over the course of their careers alone would seem to indicate that they are league average pitchers. Putting a league average pitcher in a six man rotation that is missing a few starters would be a good idea right about now.
Secondly, if we ignore the past fielding numbers and focus in on this season in particular then we notice that the Astros are considerably better defensively according to both statistical sources. So, if we couple the sea level point with simple competent defense behind either of these two pitchers then they could become better than average pitchers through sheer inertia.
Yet, the final factor is the scouting and coaching factor. These guys have been league average pitchers with the least amount of help from advanced scouting, video scouting, or any form of technological assistance. The Rockies are not only dead ass last in the amount they invest into video and technology but their ownership has called for there to be a cap on how much teams can spend in this department because they do not want to invest more. Imagine what our pitching coaches and decision scientists could do with them. I think expecting either of them to be a Yusei Kikuchi is far-fetched at best, but expecting either of them to be a solid starter is not far-fetched.
Yet, the Kikuchi factor is an interesting side point. The Toronto Blue Jays were able to precure what looked like an expensive package for a pitcher that was performing at slightly below league average. How much could a pitcher performing near the bottom the league possibly cost? I debated adding some serious snark at this point about the competency of the Rockies, but the results speak for themselves.
If the Rockies were smart, they would start to barter off assets that have value left, but likely won’t be around for the next time when they are a competitive. Now, I can look at those two pitchers and guess that the Astros would tend to favor someone like Marquez over Freeland, but the team’s scouts have generally done a good job of identifying reclamation projects. I’d leave the decision in their capable hands. However, the thought is that either one would be a better option over Ryan Gusto, Colton Gordon, or Brandon Walter.