We break down the numbers further
Last week, I took a look at offensive efficiency. Generally, the idea was to look at the number of base runners a team has and the percentage of those base runners that come home to score. We saw that the Astros percentage has been lower than in year’s past and that it ranks in the bottom ten in the league in that category. So, there can be no doubt that the Astros offense is not an efficient one.
From there, there were some possible explanations given in the article and in the comments. First, we should explore whether this team’s offense is in fact worse than it has been and in what categories it is worse. We will include some of the categories mentioned by some of the commenters in addition to some other ones.
So, we will see two tables in this study. First, we will see the raw data for the Astros in several categories. We will look at runs per game, batting average, OBP, SLG, isolated power, isolated patience, and secondary average. We will then look at the rankings in all of those categories except secondary patience. Unfortunately, it is not a recognized statistic and I don’t want to risk making a mathematical error.
We have some intelligent readers, so I’m guessing most of you are familiar with most of these numbers. Isolated power and isolated patience might be new to some of you. Both of those numbers remove batting average. So, isolated power is slugging percentage minus batting average and isolated patience is on base percentage minus batting average.
Secondary average is mostly isolated power and isolated patience added together. It is essentially everything a player can do offensively independent of batting average. So, in addition to adding those numbers it also includes a base running element to it. The beauty of it is that it can be interpreted like batting average.
As you can see, the Astros have gone in the tank the last couple of years in the isolated categories and secondary average. They have also seen their runs per game totals go in the toilet so far this season. Naturally, we should look at league norms before making any rash judgments. We will look at the Astros ML rank in each of the categories (except isolated patience) and their aggregate rankings in each category.
Why do we want to look at the aggregate ranking? Simply put, we want to see which category is a stronger correlation with run production. It will ultimately help us move forward when we look at how to solve the problem of scoring more runs. Make no mistake, it is a problem.
It is not a figment of our imagination. The Astros offense is worse than it has been. The explanations were simplistic and probably correct. You lose Alex Bregman and Kyle Tucker and your offense is going to be worse. This is particularly true when one of the two major replacements has gotten off to a slow start.
However, there is a difference between performing an autopsy and bringing the patient back to life. When we look at what actually correlates with run production we see that slugging percentage has the strongest correlation. We also notice that on base percentage and isolated power are in a virtual tie for second in terms of how strongly they are tied to run production.
We obviously did not include OPS since it combines two of these elements, but OPS is likely the strongest point of correlation in terms of run production. In other words, maximizing slugging percentage and on base percentage to a lesser extent will likely be the fastest path to improving run production.
How do we solve this problem?
There are three things any team can do in this situation. As in most things, it is not an all or nothing deal. In fact, it is probably better to do all of these things at the same time to get the best result.
The Moneyball approach
A number of folks would assume that Moneyball was all about on base percentage. That is both true and misleading. The whole idea behind Moneyball was the idea of performance scouting. If you want players to get on base then you sign and draft players that get on base. In the case of power, if you want players that hit for power than you acquire players that hit for power.
The acquisition of Isaac Paredes is probably the best example of this approach in action. You had a guy that pulls the ball and a ballpark where pull hitters are rewarded. What you wind up with is someone with 14 home runs. Christian Walker was supposed to be that kind of guy and he does have eight home runs.
So, if you want to hit for more power then you acquire players that hit for more power. Obviously, the draft and international scouting is the most effective way to do this, but it also takes the most time. The quickest routes are free agency and trade. The Astros can use free agency after the season to remedy the power problem, but that approach won’t help them this season.
Lineup Construction
If the move of Jose Altuve did anything, it made the Astros a lot more versatile. Most of their players can play multiple positions, so the team can mix and match as necessary. There has been a ton of debate about the move defensively and a ton has been written on it. I called it a wash, but others have said it is a net positive. I’m not debating that here. What I will say is that it has not been a net positive offensively.
Second Base: .217 AVG, .278 OBP, .280 SLG, .061 ISOpat, .063 ISOpow
Left Field: .228 AVG, .288 OBP, .341 SLG, .060 ISOpat, .113 ISOpow
Designated Hitter: .225 AVG, .292 OBP, .359 SLG, .067 ISOpat, .134 ISOpow
So, much of this is because Yordan Alvarez has either been out or ineffective, but the team is not without options at one or more of those spots. Obviously, you want Jose Altuve playing in one of them and given his performance offensively, that makes perfect sense, He has outpaced all three positions himself. So, he belongs. Let’s look at the options at the other two slots with minor league numbers included for Jacob Melton and Shay Whitcomb.
Mauricio Dubon: .257 AVG, .292 OBP, .347 SLG, .035 ISOpat, .090 ISOpow
Brendan Rodgers: .190 AVG, .261 OBP, .260 SLG, .071 ISOpat, .070 ISOpow
Zach Dezenzo: .245 AVG, .321 OBP, .367 SLG, .076 ISOpat, .122 ISOpow
Shay Whitcomb: .260 AVG, .331 OBP, .491 SLG, .071 ISOpat, .231 ISOpow
Jacob Melton: .251 AVG, .328 OBP, .452 SLG, .077 ISOpat, .201 ISOpow
This is really very simple. While Whitcomb and Melton have not demonstrated success at the big league level yet, we know that Dubon and Rodgers aren’t it. At least, they aren’t it offensively. Dezenzo obviously isn’t available right now, but why hasn’t Whitcomb played while up? If the choice is between someone that might hit for power and someone that won’t hit for power then that should be an easy choice. Unfortunately, it’s a choice they aren’t making right now.
Work on a new hitting approach
This is the last option because it is the least likely option to succeed. Hitters are who they usually are by the time they get to the big leagues. However, if we know that the team needs more power then there are ways to get there with the players you currently have. Obviously, simply swinging harder is not going to do it. However, choosing which pitches to attack could do the trick.
The Astros attack the first pitch and pitches early in the count. It is essentially a see ball, hit ball approach. Even if the pitch is a strike it might be a pitcher’s strike. If a pitcher can effectively hit the corners then they can manipulate hitters into making weaker contact. Weaker contract means less power.
When you get hitter’s counts you increase your on base average, but you also get more of those pitches you can attack and hit hard. Hard hit balls are more likely to end up as hits and more likely to end up as extra base hits. Like I said, it is hard to turn a free swinger into a patient hitter, but you can make subtle changes and slight improvements. Those slight improvements in concert with the first two approaches could end up making the difference.